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Abstract
It’s widely accepted that social facts about an individual’s linguistic community can affect both the 
reference of her words and the concepts (or idiolect meanings) those words express. Theorists sym-
pathetic to the internalist tradition have sought to accommodate these social dependence phenomena 
without altering their core theoretical commitments by positing deferential reference- fixing criteria. 
In this paper, we sketch a different explanation of social dependence phenomena, according to which 
all concepts are individuated in part by causal- historical relations linking token elements of thought.
from traditional accounts of the determina-
tion of reference and the individuation of 
representational state types. In response, 
theorists sympathetic to the internalist tradi-
tion have argued that they can accommodate 
the type of social dependence phenomena 
highlighted by Putnam and Burge without 
altering their core theoretical commitments. 
All that Putnam and Burge have established 
is that some concepts are deferential: other 
speakers’ ways of using words may figure in 
an individual’s own criteria for identifying 
the reference. On this deferential account of 
reference determination, both the applica-
tion conditions of a subject’s words and the 
meanings and concepts those words express 
are determined in a straightforward way by 
her internal states.
 In this paper, we sketch an alternative 
model of how social dependence relations 
affect meanings, concepts, and reference. On 
the binding model of concept identity, social 
dependence relations are part of the basic 
infrastructure for concept identity. We start 
in section 1 by exploring how an internalist 
It’s widely accepted that social facts about 
an individual’s linguistic community can 
affect both the reference of her words and 
the concepts (or idiolect meanings) those 
words express. According to Hilary Putnam 
(1975), experts’ criteria for identifying the 
extension of a natural kind term like “gold” 
help determine the reference of less expert 
speakers’ use of that term. So, if sameness of 
meaning for such terms requires sameness of 
reference, as Putnam believes, then the indi-
viduation of non- experts’ idiolect meanings 
will depend on contingent facts about their 
social environment. According to Tyler Burge 
(1979), facts about an individual’s linguistic 
community can affect the reference of the 
thoughts expressed by her non- indexical ex-
pressions. So, if sameness of non- indexical 
concepts requires sameness of reference, as 
Burge believes, then the individuation of most 
concepts will depend in part on contingent 
facts about an individual thinker’s social 
environment.
 Putnam and Burge took these social depen-
dence claims to constitute a radical departure 
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might accommodate social dependence 
through deferential reference- fixing criteria. 
In section 2, we propose two core constraints 
on an adequate theory of concept identity. 
We then contrast the traditional, broadly 
Fregean model of concepts with the binding 
model (section 3), and explain the different 
consequences the models have for who shares 
concepts (section 4). In closing, we offer two 
reasons to think the binding model is a prom-
ising alternative to the traditional internalist 
approach to representation (section 5).
1. THE ACCOMMODATION 
STRATEGy: SOCIAL DEFERENCE
 We take internalism to be a metasemantic 
thesis about which factors contribute to de-
termining the semantic values of a subject’s 
words and concepts. Our focus here is on 
the concepts expressed by context- invariant 
referential expressions (such as “elm,” “ar-
thritis,” “Gödel,” “water,” “sofa”), which have 
been the target of externalist arguments.1
Internalism: For any token element of thought 
[x], there are associated internal states (i.e., 
structural, dispositional, or phenomenal states 
individuated independently of the subject’s 
actual external environment) that (i) constitute 
the subject’s core understanding of its reference, 
and (ii) provide sufficient constraints to fix its 
reference in all possible worlds.
 In other words, subjects rely on a reference- 
fixing criterion that would put them in a 
position to identify which things fall into the 
extension of the concept in any possible world 
on the basis of ideal rational reflection: if 
presented with a full description of a possible 
world, the subject would in principle be able 
to identify precisely which things fall into the 
extension.2
 The core understanding that constitutes 
the subject’s reference- fixing criterion can 
be realized in different psychological states. 
According to simple descriptivism, for in-
stance, a reference- fixing criterion involves 
the ability to define the essential nature of the 
object, kind, or property picked out. More 
sophisticated forms of internalism allow for 
implicit reference- fixing criteria, which may 
be embodied in recognitional or inferential 
dispositions, beliefs about paradigm exem-
plars, prototypes composed of weighted sets 
of properties, internal mental models, and so 
on. Just which states embody the reference- 
fixing criterion is determined by which dis-
positions ultimately guide the subject when 
identifying the reference under conditions of 
ideal rational reflection.
 Externalist thought experiments provide 
plausible counterexamples to simple descrip-
tivism. According to our best reflective judg-
ments, a subject can be ignorant or mistaken 
about the nature of the objects, kinds, or 
properties she picks out in thought. More-
over, these mistakes can often be corrected 
only by learning empirical facts about one’s 
environment. Despite Putnam’s inability to 
distinguish elms from beeches on the basis 
of their observable physical properties, for 
instance, we take his use of “elm” to refer 
determinately to elms. Part of the explana-
tion for how this determinate reference is 
secured, Putnam suggests, is that ordinary 
speakers like himself are disposed to defer 
to “experts” in their linguistic community 
about what counts as an elm (1975). And in 
Burge’s thought experiment, we take Bert’s 
thoughts to determinately pick out the very 
same property as the rest of us—arthritis—
despite Bert’s mistaken belief that arthritis 
can occur in the thigh. Part of what justifies 
this attribution, according to Burge, is that 
Bert would take himself to stand corrected 
if his doctor (or a dictionary) informed him 
that arthritis is a disease of the joints (1979). 
If we take these judgments about reference 
at face value, it seems that facts about the 
subject’s social environment can be crucial to 
determining the reference of her words and 
thoughts. In that case, the subject’s current 
reference- fixing criteria won’t always suffice 
to identify the reference of her words and 
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thoughts independently of contingent facts 
about her actual social environment.
 There is a standard reply to such external-
ist arguments. The very fact that subjects 
take themselves to stand corrected by expert 
opinion reveals that deference to experts (or 
some other social factor) is part of their ulti-
mate criterion for identifying the reference. If 
presented with a full description of a possible 
world that includes information about the 
social environment, the subject would be able 
to identify which things fall into the extension 
of the target words and concepts after ideal 
reflection—independently of knowing any 
empirical facts about her actual environment.3 
For instance, Putnam’s criterion for being an 
elm may be: whatever satisfies the criteria 
the relevant experts associate with “elm.” 
This deferential criterion fixes the reference 
of Putnam’s term indirectly, as a function of 
contingent facts about his actual social envi-
ronment: different properties will be picked 
out, depending on the opinions of experts in 
one’s social community. The internalist can 
then use the referential judgments elicited 
by social externalist thought experiments 
to specify a subject’s deferential reference- 
fixing criterion.4
 One might worry that any specific deferen-
tial analysis will be subject to counterexam-
ples. The good news for the internalist is that 
one can appeal to the 2- D semantic framework 
to specify a subject’s internal reference- fixing 
criteria (including her ultimate dispositions 
to take facts about her linguistic community 
into account) without needing to formulate a 
strict, counterexample- free definition in natu-
ral language.5 According to David Chalmers 
and Frank Jackson, the reference of a token 
use of a word “x” (and of the concept thereby 
expressed) is determined by the individual’s 
dispositions to judge which things are x, given 
full empirical information about base- level 
facts about a possible world considered as 
actual and ideal cognitive powers.6 Chalm-
ers and Jackson then use a 2- D framework to 
define an internally determined semantic val-
ue that marks these dispositions: the epistemic 
intension of a subject’s term “x” is a function 
from every epistemically possible empirical 
scenario (roughly a centered possible world) 
to the subject’s ideal verdicts about what x is 
relative to that scenario considered as actual. 
Given that the epistemic intension is deter-
mined by the subject’s purely internal states 
together with ideal armchair reasoning about 
hypothetical scenarios, the epistemic inten-
sion can be used to demarcate a pattern of 
understanding that suffices to fix the reference 
come what may. On this approach, a subject’s 
reference- fixing criterion is simply whichever 
pattern of actual understanding would ideally 
generate a specific epistemic intension.
 The key novelty introduced by social de-
pendence phenomena in the 2- D framework 
is that the subject’s epistemic intensions take 
into account not just facts about her external 
physical environment, but also meta- cognitive 
facts about others’ understanding and use of 
“x.” The subject’s ideal dispositions to react 
to meta- cognitive information will reflect her 
ideal views about who counts as members of 
her linguistic community, about which events 
count as uses of the same term “x,” about how 
to take others’ opinions about the applicabil-
ity of “x” into account, and about when to 
conclude that others’ opinions diverge too 
much to be relevant to fixing the reference 
of her own use of “x.”
 The availability of this 2- D strategy sug-
gests that externalist counterexamples (social 
or otherwise) needn’t pose any deep chal-
lenge to metasemantic internalism. Insofar as 
the alleged counterexamples accord with the 
subject’s own ideal reflective verdicts, there 
will be internal dispositions that generate 
those verdicts. These dispositions can then 
be captured by an epistemic intension. And 
insofar as alleged counterexamples flout the 
subject’s own ideal dispositions, the internal-
ist can simply deny that they have any intui-
tive force.
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2. CONCEPTS AND APPARENT  
De Jure SAMENESS
 To mount a plausible challenge to the tradi-
tional approach to representation, a semantic 
externalist should not focus on the internal-
ist metasemantics considered in isolation. 
Instead, she should step back and ask how 
the internalist’s accommodation strategy fits 
within a broader theory of representational 
state types. The key question is how an in-
ternalist metasemantics, which invokes social 
deference, contributes to a plausible account 
of concepts (and idiolect meanings).
 A theory of concepts must answer two 
questions, one about what it takes to instan-
tiate the same representational state type, 
and one about the determination of semantic 
values:7
1. Concept identity: What makes it the case 
that two token words or elements of thought 
express the same concept?
2. Metasemantics: What makes it the case that 
a token word or element of thought has the 
semantic value it does?
 Focusing on representational state types 
reflects core aspects of the philosophical 
debate over metasemantic internalism. Early 
proponents of social dependence relations 
like Kripke, Putnam, Devitt, and Burge had a 
guiding interest in individuating shared repre-
sentational state types. In particular, the most 
influential proponent of social dependence 
relations, Tyler Burge, has repeatedly empha-
sized that his primary concern is to show how 
external factors are crucial to determining 
whether two individuals share the same fine- 
grained representational states—concepts or 
whole thought contents.8 Likewise, metase-
mantic internalists like Lewis, Jackson, 
Chalmers, and Segal highlight the role an 
internalist account of reference- determination 
plays in individuating idiolect meanings and 
concepts.9
 In this section, we’ll clarify two constraints 
on an adequate theory of concept identity. 
This step is important because it will put us 
in a position to articulate and motivate an al-
ternative to the traditional theory of concepts 
in which metasemantic internalism finds its 
home. To make room for this alternative 
approach, we’ll need to isolate the precise 
explanandum in a theory of concept identity. 
On the alternative binding model of concepts 
that we’ll sketch, social relations play an es-
sential role in concept individuation—one 
that’s very different from the reference- fixing 
role assigned to social dependence relations 
by the internalist accommodationist strategy 
canvassed in section 1.
 A first constraint on an adequate account of 
concept identity is that, for non- indexical con-
cepts like [elm], sameness of concept entails 
sameness of reference. Any two individuals 
who share the concept [elm] must thereby 
represent the very same property—no matter 
how different their background beliefs about 
the topic, and no matter how different their 
external social or physical circumstances. 
So the theory of concept identity and the 
metasemantic theory, together, must ensure 
that any two tokens of the concept [elm] must 
be assigned the very same reference, irrespec-
tive of the psychological, social, or physical 
contexts in which those two tokens occur.
 A second constraint concerns the cogni-
tive significance marked by concepts. It’s 
generally agreed that concepts mark modes 
of presentation or ways of thinking of refer-
ence. More specifically, we suggest, the core 
explanatory role of concepts is to capture our 
most basic ways of keeping track of a topic 
in thought. Ordinary human learning and 
reasoning would be impossible without some 
basic ways of organizing our cognitive states 
by topic. Our ability to learn about Hesperus, 
for example, to amass a body of attitudes and 
dispositions pertaining to that topic, to form 
new beliefs about it, to retrieve relevant in-
formation via memory, and to stay on topic in 
reasoning—all these basic cognitive abilities 
depend on a stable organizational structure. 
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We have argued elsewhere that these basic 
ways of organizing our cognitive states by 
topic depend on subpersonal mechanisms 
that give rise to a specific epistemic signa-
ture at the conscious level.10 When a subject 
consciously entertains a train of thought, 
certain elements seem guaranteed to pertain 
to the very same topic, simply in virtue of 
the way they are presented in thought. We 
call this the appearance of de jure sameness. 
So, concepts must be individuated in such a 
way as to reflect the subjective appearance 
of guaranteed sameness of topic.
 To get a clearer view of the appearance 
of de jure sameness, consider an example. 
Throughout a conscious episode of reasoning 
about Hesperus, a subject’s thoughts present 
themselves to her conscious attention as ob-
viously and incontrovertibly about the very 
same thing, Hesperus. We’d like to emphasize 
three features of this apparent de jure same-
ness:
i. Obviousness: The subject is immediately 
disposed to treat these thoughts as pertaining 
to the same topic in her reasoning. There’s 
no need for her to engage in reflection or 
investigation to establish sameness of topic. 
Indeed, in entertaining these thoughts, the 
question of sameness simply doesn’t arise: 
from the object- level perspective, it’s not an 
open question whether Hesperus is Hesperus.
ii. Rational incontrovertibility: From the 
object- level perspective, it seems logically 
incoherent to deny the identity of topic: 
there is no conceivable circumstance in 
which Hesperus could fail to be Hesperus. 
(A logically coherent doubt can, however, be 
raised if one adopts a meta- level perspective 
on one’s own thoughts: one can coherently 
deny that certain thoughts co- refer.)
iii. Epistemic basicness: This subjective ap-
pearance of obvious and incontrovertible 
sameness is not based on or reinforced 
by independent evidence of sameness: no 
object- level evidence about Hesperus could 
help justify the apparently trivial identity 
claim that Hesperus is Hesperus.11
 It’s important to note that this character-
ization of apparent de jure sameness does 
not entail that the appearance is veridical. 
Indeed, the appearance of de jure sameness is 
only characteristic of the subject’s epistemic 
perspective in object- level thinking about 
the world—but it disappears as soon as one 
adopts a meta- level perspective on those 
thoughts.
 Not all thoughts that the subject takes to 
pertain to the same topic exhibit apparent 
de jure sameness. Unlike the question of 
whether Hesperus is Hesperus, the question 
of whether Hesperus really is Phosphorus is 
open: one could rationally doubt the identity 
and one could cite object- level empirical facts 
that would lend support to one’s conviction 
that there’s just one topic in question. We 
call the phenomenology associated with non- 
trivial identities the appearance of de facto 
sameness of topic.
 The distinction between apparent de jure 
and de facto sameness, we suggest, captures 
the core explanandum of Fregean cognitive 
significance: the subjective epistemic differ-
ence between trivial and non- trivial identities 
in thought. Unlike standard ways of under-
standing Fregean cognitive significance, 
however, the notion of apparent de jure same-
ness does not build in any assumptions about 
what generates or vindicates these subjective 
appearances. In particular, it does not assume 
that the appearance of de jure sameness is 
explained by a match in the reference- fixing 
criteria associated with token words or ele-
ments of thought.
 The appearance of de jure sameness is 
crucial to determining direct logical relations 
among thought contents. The premise [Hes-
perus appears in the evening], for instance, 
does not logically entail the conclusion 
[Phosphorus appears in the evening]: minimal 
logical coherence does not require the subject 
to accept the conclusion whenever she ac-
cepts the premise, even though the truth of 
the premise metaphysically guarantees the 
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truth of the conclusion. Similarly, relations 
of apparent de jure sameness are neces-
sary for direct logical contradictions among 
thought contents. The fact that it’s logically 
contradictory for the subject to accept that 
Hesperus appears in the evening and to accept 
that Hesperus does not appear in the evening 
depends on the apparent de jure sameness 
of topic: from the subject’s perspective, it 
seems obvious and incontrovertible that 
both thoughts pick out the very same thing 
(Hesperus) and attribute the very same prop-
erty (appearing in the evening). Of course, 
genuine logical relations among thoughts 
also require objective sameness of topic, not 
just the appearance of sameness. But when 
appearances of de jure sameness of topic are 
veridical—that is, when they’re vindicated 
by the correct metasemantic theory—then the 
resulting de jure sameness relations fix the 
logical form of thought contents. A primary 
role of a theory of concept identity is to mark 
these relations of de jure sameness among 
elements of thought.
 The role of concepts in demarcating the 
logical form of thoughts underwrites the core 
theoretical roles they play in rationalizing 
explanations and in normative assessments 
of the subject’s rationality. The subjective 
appearance of de jure sameness by itself helps 
explain why subjects are disposed to combine 
certain standing attitudes in reasoning. If a 
subject consciously entertains thoughts of 
the form [Pa → Gb] and [Pa], then given the 
appearance of de jure sameness among the 
constituents, we’d expect her to draw the con-
clusion [Gb]. These subjective appearances 
also determine norms of minimal rational-
ity: if the subject were to consciously accept 
thoughts of the form [Gb] and [~Gb], we’d 
criticize her for flouting standards of minimal 
logical coherence. Finally, the veridicality of 
apparent de jure sameness relations is crucial 
to determining the subject’s ultimate rational 
goals and corresponding standards for norma-
tive assessment. If the appearance of de jure 
sameness linking the elements of the subject’s 
modus ponens inference were not veridical, 
then we would not assess her reasoning as 
logically valid: despite the subjective ap-
pearance of validity, the reasoning would be 
objectively invalid. The objective perspective 
on logical relations is important because it 
captures the subject’s own commitments to 
getting facts about the world right, and the 
assessor’s interest in relating the subject’s 
thoughts to the world.
 We have highlighted the importance of 
apparent de jure sameness as the epistemic 
signature of our most basic ways of keep-
ing track of sameness of topic in thought. 
A theory of concepts should individuate 
representational state types in such a way 
as to reflect these subjective appearances. 
At the same time, to capture genuine logical 
relations among thoughts, a theory of concept 
identity together with the metasemantics must 
explain how sameness of non- indexical con-
cepts guarantees objective sameness of refer-
ence. This dual role of referential concepts, 
in marking both the appearance and reality 
of de jure co- reference, sets up important 
challenges, especially in explaining concept 
identity over time and between subjects. In 
the next section, we contrast two models of 
concept identity, the matching model and the 
binding model, which represent two strategies 
for answering the metasemantic and identity 
questions in a theory of concepts.
3. TWO MODELS OF CONCEPT 
IDENTITy
 The traditional broadly Fregean approach 
to concepts combines a matching model of 
concept identity with an internalist metase-
mantics. We will start with a simple version 
of the model:
1. Matching model1: Two token elements of 
thought [x] and [y] express the same non- 
indexical referential concept iff each token is 
associated with exactly the same reference- 
fixing criterion Cn.
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2. Internalism: For any token element of 
thought [x], there are associated internal 
states F that (i) constitute the subject’s core 
understanding of its reference, and (ii) pro-
vide sufficient constraints to fix its reference 
in all possible worlds.
 According to this matching model, a single 
theoretical posit—a reference- fixing criterion 
associated with a token element of thought at 
a given time—fulfills both theoretical roles in 
an account of referential concepts. Each token 
element of thought is independently associ-
ated with a reference- fixing criterion, Cn, that 
suffices to determine the essential nature of 
the object, kind, or property represented. And 
concept identity is determined by a precise 
match in reference- fixing criteria: two ele-
ments of thought express the same concept 
just in case each is associated with the very 
same reference- fixing criterion Cn.
 The matching model of concepts suggests 
a straightforward way of satisfying our two 
constraints on a theory of concept identity. 
First, concepts must be individuated in such 
a way as to reflect the subjective appearance 
of de jure sameness. On the matching model 
of concept identity, sameness of concept is 
determined by internal states that constitute 
the subject’s implicit understanding of the 
reference. If two tokens of [Hesperus] are 
each associated with precisely the same 
implicit reference- fixing criteria, this fact 
might explain why it seems obvious and 
incontrovertible that there’s just one thing in 
question when one entertains those tokens 
in one’s object- level thinking. Second, for 
non- indexical referential concepts like [Hes-
perus], sameness of concept entails sameness 
of reference. If the criteria associated with a 
token element of thought suffice to determine 
its reference in any possible world, then the 
matching model of concept identity can ex-
plain why any two tokens of the same concept 
will be logically guaranteed to co- refer: not 
only will two tokens associated with the same 
reference- fixing criteria seem co- referential, 
according to internalist metasemantics, they 
are guaranteed to co- refer irrespective of the 
empirical context in which they occur.
 However, the indirect reference- fixing 
strategy that internalists appeal to in order to 
accommodate externalist counterexamples 
introduces a complication to the match-
ing model of concept identity. An indirect 
reference- fixing criterion fixes the reference 
relative to contingent facts about the subject’s 
historical, social, or physical context. So 
there’s no guarantee that two tokens associ-
ated with the same indirect criterion must 
co- refer—for the tokens may occur in dif-
ferent contexts. While the matching model 
of concept identity may explain why two 
tokens of non- indexical referential concepts 
like [Hesperus], [water], or [arthritis] seem 
obviously and incontrovertibly co- referential 
when one consciously entertains them in 
thought, it cannot explain why they are in fact 
logically guaranteed to co- refer. The worry is 
that indirect reference- fixing criteria cannot 
explain the direct logical relations among 
thoughts that concepts are supposed to mark.
 This isn’t a decisive objection to the match-
ing model of concept identity. For the match-
ing model can be modified to accommodate 
this empirical fallibility while still explaining 
why the appearance of de jure sameness is a 
reliable guide to the truth. The first step is 
simply to add an extra clause in the account 
of concept identity:
Matching model2: Two token elements of 
thought [x] and [y] express the same non- 
indexical referential concept iff (i) each token 
is associated with exactly the same indirect 
reference- fixing criterion Cn, and (ii) both 
tokens occur in contexts that are alike with re-
spect to the relevant empirical reference- fixing 
features.
 So, according to the matching model2, Bert 
and his counterfactual twin may have dif-
ferent concepts, [arthritis] and [tharthritis], 
despite the fact that they rely on precisely the 
same deferential reference- fixing criterion. In 
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such cases, sameness of concept depends on 
sameness of social context—just as Burge 
argues. However, in contrast to Burge’s own 
brand of anti- individualism about concept 
identity, the matching model2 preserves 
the core of the traditional matching model 
of concepts. On the matching model2, the 
logical guarantee of co- reference is explained 
in terms of a precise match in competent 
subjects’ reference- fixing criteria, which 
guarantees two tokens will co- refer relative 
to the same empirical context—no matter 
what that context is like. But unlike the tra-
ditional matching model, this guarantee can 
be defeated if the empirical contexts of use 
diverge, like those of Bert and Twin Bert.12
 This concludes our rough sketch of how a 
matching model, broadly construed, seeks to 
explain both apparent and objective de jure 
sameness relations among thoughts. But there 
are many details that an adequate model of 
concept identity must fill in. In particular, 
we’d like to flag the following outstanding 
issues for matching models:
1. Apparent de jure sameness: In our sketch of 
the matching model, we focused on explain-
ing the rational incontrovertibility that’s 
characteristic of logical relations among 
thoughts. But, as we saw in section 2, ap-
parent de jure sameness involves two further 
epistemic features that will be harder for a 
matching model to explain: obviousness and 
basicness. And this sets up a challenge for 
the matching model: the more the model 
seeks to accommodate externalist intuitions 
about the ways the subject’s current under-
standing of the reference is fallible, the less 
subjectively obvious the ultimate reference- 
fixing criteria will become, and the harder it 
will be to capture obviousness and basicness. 
The worry, then, is that the structure of the 
matching model makes it difficult to fully 
explain the appearance of de jure sameness 
(Schroeter 2003; Schroeter and Schroeter 
2009).
2. Demarcating competence conditions: What 
are the principles for determining precisely 
which aspects of associated understanding 
get included in the reference- fixing criterion 
Cn for a token element of thought? Can the 
account avoid an implausible holism in the 
reference- fixing criteria, which would entail 
that concepts are not normally stable over 
time and between subjects? Do we really 
need to share precisely the same reference- 
fixing criteria in order to ensure direct logical 
relations over time and between subjects? 
Many self- described externalists have raised 
worries along these lines for matching mod-
els of meanings and concepts (Stalnaker 
1993; yablo 2000; Schroeter 2003, 2004, 
2006).
3. Deference relations: How exactly do social 
dependence relations work: Which uses does 
the subject treat as authoritative, and in what 
ways? Can social dependence dispositions 
always be interpreted in a non- circular 
way—so that A’s dispositions to defer to an 
individual or group B, and B’s dispositions 
do not take A’s dispositions into account? 
The deference model seems to require that 
social deference criteria depend for their 
reference on other’s subject’s non- social 
criteria. But, arguably, even the most expert 
speakers are disposed to take communal 
use into account in determining the precise 
reference of their words and thoughts (Burge 
1986, 1989; Schroeter 2014; Schroeter and 
Schroeter 2015).
4. Apriority and fallibility: According to a 
matching model, the subject’s ultimate 
reference- fixing criteria have the same a 
priori epistemic status as a stipulative defini-
tion. But how independently plausible is this 
alleged a priori status? (Kripke 1980; Speaks 
2010). Can failsafe reference- fixing criteria 
be reconciled with the idea that we represent 
objectively important, mind- independent 
features of environment? (Millikan 1984, 
1993).
 We raise these points here not as decisive 
objections to a matching model, but just as 
an indication that this standard account of 
concept identity faces significant challenges.
 Let’s turn now to the binding model of so-
cial dependence relations. What’s distinctive 
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of a binding model is that it treats real- world 
causal- historical relations as at least partly 
constitutive of concept identity. Here’s a 
simple version:
Binding Model1: Two token elements of thought 
[x] and [y] express the very same non- indexical 
referential concept iff those elements stand in 
causal- historical relation R to each other.
 Sameness of concept, on this account, is 
determined by a causal- historical relation 
linking token elements of thought, rather than 
by a match in the properties independently as-
sociated with particular tokens. The intuitive 
idea is that R binds token elements of thought 
into a continuous representational tradition 
in which the R- linked words and thoughts 
are treated as pertaining de jure to the same 
topic. So expressing the same concept is an 
irreducibly relational fact, like belonging to 
the same family or the same biological spe-
cies.
 To play the role of demarcating a shared 
representational tradition, R must include 
both intrapersonal relations, Ri, linking ele-
ments of an individual subject’s thoughts 
at a time and over time, and interpersonal 
relations, Rs, linking thoughts of different 
individuals within a linguistic community. 
For instance, when a subject engages in a 
chain of conscious reasoning, subpersonal 
cognitive mechanisms ensure that certain 
occurrent thoughts are all presented to her 
conscious attention as pertaining de jure to 
the same topic. Moreover, most of those oc-
current thoughts are causally linked to stable 
dispositional attitudes that persist over time, 
forming an uninterrupted causal- historical 
link between her occurrent thoughts now to 
the past attitudes that originally gave rise to 
them. The subject might form a stable belief, 
for instance, that she’d express as “Pavarotti’s 
favorite drink is water”—and this persisting 
belief will strike the subject as pertaining de 
jure to the same object and the same property 
throughout its existence. Similarly, when a 
subject converses with others, her “water” 
thoughts are causally linked to the thoughts 
her interlocutor expresses with “water,” and 
chains of such links extend out from her 
interlocutors to other English speakers, past 
and present, to form a continuous shared 
representational tradition.
 How can a binding model satisfy our two 
constraints on concept identity? First, con-
cepts must reflect the subjective appearance of 
de jure sameness. The binding model claims 
that apparent de jure sameness is an irreduc-
ibly relational matter: apparent sameness 
does not supervene on the properties of the 
bound elements considered independently. 
Whereas a matching model seeks to explain 
apparent de jure sameness in terms of match-
ing reference- fixing criteria, a binding model 
treats apparent de jure sameness as an epis-
temically basic fact generated by subpersonal 
mechanisms linking the relevant token states.
 Second, a binding model requires a very 
different explanation of how sameness of 
concept guarantees co- reference, from that of 
a matching model. Given that concept identity 
is determined by relation R, it’s natural to take 
the default unit for semantic interpretation to 
be the representational tradition as a whole, 
rather than token thought episodes considered 
independently.
Metasemantic coordination: The default units 
for semantic interpretation are the temporally 
and socially extended representational tradi-
tions demarcated by R. So, a token element of 
thought [x] normally inherits its semantic value 
from the representational tradition to which it 
is bound by R.
 Metasemantic coordination is a constraint 
on acceptable principles for assigning se-
mantic values on a binding model; it must be 
supplemented by substantive metasemantic 
principles. But the coordination constraint 
is sufficient to distinguish the metasemantic 
approach characteristic of binding models 
from that of matching models. On a binding 
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model, the reference of a token element of 
thought [x] is determined on the basis of a set 
of properties P of the whole representational 
tradition demarcated by R: for example, pat-
terns of attitudes and cognitive dispositions 
associated with the concept, history of how 
uses of the concept are causally triggered by 
features of the environment, causal feedback 
relations entrenching the use of the concept 
over time, shared practical and theoretical 
interests subserved by the tradition, principles 
of rationalizing interpretation.
 If Metasemantic coordination is correct, it’s 
no accident that two speakers of English at a 
given time refer to the same thing when they 
think about “water” or “arthritis” or “Gödel”: 
co- reference is ensured by the fact that each 
token is appropriately causally linked to a 
common representational tradition. Different 
speakers might have slightly different com-
mitments about what kind of stuff water is, 
which samples count as instances of water, 
the best methods for discovering its nature, or 
which experts are the most trustworthy, and 
so on. And these differences might ground 
distinct reference- fixing criteria for the in-
dividuals considered in isolation, yielding 
different verdicts about the reference relative 
to some possible social or physical environ-
ments. Still, if the default unit for assigning 
reference is the representational tradition as a 
whole, rather than a token element of thought 
at a time, a single univocal reference will 
normally be assigned to the tradition despite 
these variations in individuals’ understand-
ing.
 However, the simple binding model must 
be modified if it is to accommodate commit-
ments about reference elicited by externalist 
thought experiments. The problem is that, 
according to our best reflective standards, 
the appearance of de jure sameness does 
not guarantee co- reference. Gareth Evans’s 
Madagascar case (1973) and Tyler Burge’s 
slow switching case (1988), for instance, are 
examples of stable representational traditions 
that preserve the appearance of de jure 
sameness over time but which seem to shift 
their semantic values as a consequence of a 
persistent mistaken identity: eventually some 
token thoughts expressed by “Madagascar” 
and “water” in the tradition come to have a 
new reference in virtue of new patterns of 
use by a whole community or by a particular 
individual. So, the default presumption of 
co- reference within a single representational 
tradition can be defeated.
 To accommodate such cases, a plausible 
binding model of concept identity must be 
hedged, just as the sophisticated matching 
model was. Here’s one hedging strategy:
Binding model2: Two token elements of thought 
express the same non- indexical referential 
concept iff (i) those elements stand in a specific 
causal- historical relation, R, to each other, and 
(ii) there are no undefeated defeaters to the 
default presumption of co- reference.
 On this hedged version of the model, 
concept identity is beholden to both causal- 
historical facts about representational tradi-
tions and metasemantic facts about the best 
interpretation of those traditions.13
 We have provided a schematic characteriza-
tion of the binding model of concepts. The 
two core commitments of such a model are: 
(i) that sameness of concept (or meaning) 
depends on a causal- historical relation R, and 
(ii) that R demarcates default units for seman-
tic interpretation. A number of very different 
theories arguably satisfy these constraints: for 
example, causal- historical theories of names 
and natural kind terms (Kripke 1980; Devitt 
1981), teleosemantic theories of mental con-
tent (Millikan 1984, 2000; Dretske 1988), 
mental file models of semantic coordination 
(Perry 1980, 2001; Heim 1982; Cumming 
2013), relational semantic rules (Fine 2007; 
Pinillos 2011), relational accounts of word 
individuation (Kaplan 1990; Fiengo and 
May 2006), and our connectedness model 
of concept identity (Schroeter 2008, 2012; 
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Schroeter and Schroeter 2009, 2014b). An 
adequate binding model must flesh out this 
core structure. Key challenges include:
1. Apparent de jure sameness: What exactly is 
relation R? How is R related to the subjec-
tive appearance of obvious and rationally 
indubitable sameness characteristic of con-
cepts? What exactly are the limits of the 
representational traditions demarcated by R? 
One might worry that an account that appeals 
to socially and temporally extended chains 
of apparent de jure sameness will lose the 
requisite connection to immediate subjective 
appearances.
2. Metasemantics: What are the principles for 
assigning a semantic value to representation-
al traditions? When (if ever) is the default 
presumption of co- reference defeated? Can 
such defeating conditions be specified with-
out assuming that token elements of thought 
earn their semantic values independently of a 
representational tradition (and thus violating 
Metasemantic coordination)?
3. Identity: Can a binding model define concept 
identity as an equivalence relation—that is, 
reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive? Some 
theorists have argued that relational accounts 
will violate transitivity (Fine 2007; Pinillos 
2011).14
4. DEFERENCE VERSUS 
COORDINATION
 Social dependence relations play a very 
different structural role in the binding model 
of concepts than in the matching model. In 
the binding model, the diachronic and social 
coordination relations Ri and Rs that define 
shared representational traditions help consti-
tute concept identity in general. The matching 
model might include a relation like Rs as part 
of an individual’s deferential reference- fixing 
criterion Cn for certain token elements of 
thought. In that case, a disposition to rely on 
Rs will be a necessary condition for sharing 
the same deferential concept. But a binding 
model treats actually standing in relations Ri 
and Rs as necessary conditions for sameness 
of any concept over time or between subjects: 
these external coordination relations are part 
of the basic infrastructure for concept iden-
tity, not an optional feature characteristic of 
particular concepts.
 This structural difference between the two 
models generates two very different pictures 
of who shares socially dependent concepts.
i. According to the binding model of concept 
identity, individuals who aren’t causally 
connected in the relevant way by R cannot 
share the same concepts. So, Davidson’s 
swampman, for instance, won’t share any 
of the same concepts as the rest of us; and 
we won’t share any concepts with causally 
unconnected linguistic communities like 
those on Putnam’s Twin Earth.
ii. According to the matching model of concept 
identity, individuals who don’t share pre-
cisely the same reference- fixing criteria Cn 
cannot share the same concept. So, Putnam 
and the tree experts to whom he defers don’t 
express the same concept with “elm”; and 
the concept Putnam himself expresses with 
“elm” may change, perhaps many times, 
as he learns more about the nature of elms, 
about the best methods for identifying them, 
and about which experts to trust and how 
much to trust them.
 In short, a binding model makes concepts 
unstable across different representational 
traditions, whereas a matching model makes 
concepts unstable across differences in 
reference- fixing criteria within a single rep-
resentational tradition.
 For many theorists, (i) will seem a problem-
atic consequence of the binding model—for 
it seems to conflict with commonsense intu-
itions about sameness of concepts. However, 
commonsense verdicts about when it’s appro-
priate to say people share the same “meaning” 
or “concept” are sensitive to many different 
pragmatic factors, and they reflect different 
theoretically important features of subjects’ 
representational states. Any systematic theory 
of concept identity will violate some of our 
commonsense ways of speaking. As (ii) 
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illustrates, matching models simply flout a 
different set of commonsense verdicts about 
who shares the same “concepts.” Whether to 
accept the binding model will come down 
to the theoretical work it does, not how it 
conforms to commonsense ways of speaking 
(Schroeter and Schroeter 2014a).
 Let’s turn now to (ii). It’s well known 
that the matching model of concept identity 
faces challenges in accounting for concep-
tual stability through theory change. But it’s 
important to see that appealing to deferential 
reference- fixing criteria does not address this 
problem—if anything, it makes concepts 
more unstable. Consider a simple deferential 
model on which the reference of Putnam’s 
“elm” thoughts is determined by his treating 
a certain type of people, “the tree experts,” as 
infallible gurus about which things count as 
elms. To share the same deferential concept 
with Putnam, you must be disposed to treat 
precisely the same descriptively characterized 
set of people as gurus. That is, if we were to 
slot you and Putnam into different possible 
social scenarios, the two of you would always 
arrive at precisely the same verdicts about 
whose word to trust. Even if the two of you 
happen to defer to the very same set of people 
in the actual world, and so your words have 
the same extension in the actual world, the 
fact that your verdicts would diverge with 
respect to some non- actual social context 
suffices to establish that your reference- fixing 
criteria diverge. According to a matching 
model of concept identity, it follows that you 
do not share the same concept.
 This conceptual instability is not an artifact 
of the particular deferential model we choose 
to consider. Any non- circular deferential 
reference- fixing criterion, which makes the 
reference of one person’s thoughts depend 
on that of others, will have the same conse-
quence.15 Introducing deferential reference- 
fixing criteria is incompatible with sameness 
of concept among all members of a linguistic 
community.
 It’s easy to be confused about this point 
because deferential concepts combine 
two distinct mechanisms for ensuring co- 
reference: (a) concept identity, and (b) real- 
world causal- historical deference relations 
linking distinct concepts. On the matching 
model, a match in reference- fixing criteria 
(together with a match in context) is the gen-
eral metasemantic mechanism that explains 
de jure co- reference, both for deferential and 
non- deferential concepts. Given the same 
physical and social context, it’s logically 
impossible that two individuals with the same 
reference- fixing criteria could pick out dis-
tinct things, since their reference will co- vary 
no matter what their shared context is like. 
On this model, direct logical relations among 
thoughts are secured by matching reference- 
fixing criteria—these are what determine the 
logical form of thought contents.
 But in the case of deferential concepts there 
is a further mechanism that can establish 
co- reference between thinkers. Deferential 
reference- fixing criteria make the reference 
of the concept expressed by one person’s 
use of a word depend on the reference of the 
concepts expressed by others’ uses of the 
word. In effect, a deferential reference- fixing 
criterion gives instructions for identifying a 
different, non- deferential reference- fixing 
criterion and treating it as authoritative. On 
this view, just which non- deferential crite-
rion is actually authoritative will depend on 
contingent facts about the subject’s social 
environment. For instance, the reference of 
Bert’s “arthritis” concept will depend on 
which concepts happen to be deployed by 
expert speakers within Bert’s actual linguis-
tic community. This one- way dependence 
relation can establish de facto co- reference 
between Bert’s deferential concept and the 
non- deferential concept expressed by those 
to whom he defers. But there is no de jure 
guarantee of co- reference between a deferen-
tial concept and the non- deferential concepts 
to which the subject happens to defer. It’s a 
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purely contingent matter that Bert’s deference 
dispositions happened to treat as authoritative 
the non- deferential concept [arthritis] (i.e., 
rheumatoid ailment of the joints) rather than 
the concept [tharthritis] (i.e., any rheuma-
toid ailment). In sum, whereas the matching 
model allows social dependence relations to 
play a role in ensuring de facto co- reference 
among members of a linguistic community, 
they do not ground the de jure co- reference 
relations that are distinctive of concept iden-
tity.
5. TWO ADVANTAGES  
OF THE BINDING MODEL
 We have contrasted two ways of incorporat-
ing social dependence relations in a theory 
of concepts—the matching model and the 
binding model. Although we favor the second 
model, we have not argued for it here: our 
aim has been to clarify the core structural 
differences between the two models. In clos-
ing, we would like to quickly highlight what 
we take to be two important advantages of 
the binding model—one psychological, one 
epistemological.
 Prima facie, the binding model fits better 
with both the first- person phenomenology of 
de jure sameness and the cognitive mecha-
nisms that underlie it. The appearance of de 
jure sameness is not confined to co- conscious 
thoughts within a given individual: it extends 
to past thoughts and to thoughts linguistically 
expressed by others. When Bert remembers 
glimpsing Cate Blanchett at the airport, Bert’s 
occurrent memory seems to present the con-
tent of his past thoughts as de jure pertaining 
to the same topic as his current beliefs about 
the star. And when he hears others using the 
term “arthritis,” he understands their claims 
as pertaining de jure to the same topic as he 
himself associates with that term. In such 
cases, the appearance of de jure sameness 
does not seem to depend on a precise match 
in reference- fixing criteria. First, a subject’s 
ultimate reference- fixing criteria can depend 
on highly abstract, non- obvious dispositional 
states like his ultimate dispositions to defer 
to certain sorts of people under certain con-
ditions, but not others. It’s hard to see how 
the appearance of de jure sameness could 
be generated by detecting a perfect match in 
such dispositions. Second, it seems possible 
to coherently reject virtually any particular 
substantive claim about “arthritis” without 
threatening the appearance of de jure same-
ness.16 When Bert’s doctor says “Arthritis 
is a disease of the joints,” or when his guru 
says “Doctors are not experts on arthritis,” 
Bert will automatically hear both claims as 
pertaining de jure to the same topic as his own 
“arthritis” thoughts. It seems psychologically 
implausible that this appearance counterfac-
tually depends on a match in criteria that are 
sufficiently detailed to guarantee co- reference 
in all possible situations. It’s more economi-
cal to suppose that subpersonal binding mech-
anisms generate these appearances directly, 
without needing to monitor and match the 
precise associated dispositions.17
 The binding model also fits better with our 
normative commitments as rational epistemic 
agents. Concept identity should not be tied 
too closely to topic- specific assumptions 
(criteria of application, epistemic methods 
for self- correction, and so on) if we want to 
allow for the possibility of conceptual sta-
bility through open- ended inquiry, debate, 
and disagreement. The matching model 
individuates concepts in terms of a specific 
aspect of substantive understanding that’s 
sufficiently rich to fix the reference (relative 
to a context). As a consequence, the model 
is structurally committed to strict limits 
on what can be coherently rejected. On a 
matching model, successful rational inquiry 
can easily lead to a change in concept when 
the subject abandons aspects of her prior 
understanding that she discovers to be false 
(Schroeter 2006). So, accepting the upshot 
of successful rational inquiry can break 
the chain of de jure sameness relations that 
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ground direct logical relations among thought 
contents. This verdict doesn’t just violate the 
immediate subjective appearance of de jure 
sameness. From an epistemological perspec-
tive, it imposes implausible epistemic norms: 
in order to maintain direct logical relations 
with one’s past beliefs about a topic (many 
of which persist as standing attitudes about 
that topic), one must not abandon certain as-
sumptions that one has discovered to be false. 
On the binding model, in contrast, sameness 
of concept does not depend on accepting any 
particular set of substantive commitments 
about the reference. Because direct binding 
relations demarcate stable default units for 
semantic interpretation, there is no need for 
a binding account to posit a perfect match in 
reference- fixing criteria. As a consequence, 
the binding model can accommodate a much 
wider range of ignorance, error, and direct 
logical disagreement than a matching model.
 This flexibility about the substantive under-
standing required for direct logical relations, 
we submit, fits with a plausible epistemology 
of reference. From the point of view of a 
rational epistemic agent, one’s higher- order 
opinions about the best epistemic methods for 
correcting one’s first- order assumptions about 
the reference are no more infallible than the 
first- order assumptions themselves. The im-
portance of stability of idiolect meanings and 
concepts has been emphasized by externalists 
like Putnam and Burge. Indeed, we take the 
real challenge to metasemantic internalism to 
derive from our epistemological commitment 
to de jure co- reference through open- ended 
inquiry and debate, rather than from simple 
conceivability arguments (Schroeter 2008).
The University of Melbourne
NOTES
1. To simplify the exposition, we’ll assume that certain idiolect meanings map directly onto concepts: 
when one uses a context- neutral expression like “arthritis,” one thereby expresses a context- neutral 
concept [arthritis].
2. This formulation of internalism is based on Chalmers and Jackson (2001). To avoid trivialization 
of the internalist position, the descriptions of the possible worlds must not (i) use the target word or 
concept, and (ii) include semantic or metasemantic information about the target word or concept. This 
internalist metasemantic framework presupposes that there is some base- level vocabulary for describ-
ing possible worlds that affords unproblematic epistemic access to objective properties—a claim that 
externalists would challenge (Stalnaker 2008). For a systematic elaboration and defense of this internalist 
commitment, see Chalmers (2012).
3. Proponents of a “deferential” model of concepts and idiolect meanings include Chomsky (1986); 
Peacocke (1992); Fodor (1994); Chalmers and Jackson (2001); Goldberg (2009).
4. For this line of argument, see Chalmers and Jackson (2001).
5. Influential advocates of this use of the 2- D semantic framework include Lewis (1994); Chalmers 
(1996, 2006); Jackson (1998); Chalmers and Jackson (2001). For an overview of different approaches 
to 2- D semantics, see Schroeter (2010).
6. Like more standard descriptivist analyses, a 2- D characterization of the semantic value of an ex-
pression must posit a base- level vocabulary that affords epistemically direct access to the fundamental 
properties that define a possible scenario considered as actual. Chalmers and Jackson suggest that 
epistemically possible scenarios can be specified in terms of a base- level vocabulary, PQTI, which 
includes descriptive terms for basic microphysical and phenomenal properties (P and Q), a “that’s all” 
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clause (T), and an “I am here” self- locating clause (I). See Chalmers and Jackson (2001); Chalmers 
(2006, 2012), for details about the proposed epistemic 2- D framework.
7. For a structurally equivalent division of the central tasks of a theory of concepts, see Peacocke’s 
distinction between a theory of possession conditions and a determination theory (1992). As indicated 
above, we will take the questions of concepts and idiolect meanings to be equivalent in the cases we 
focus on.
8. Burge (1979, 1982, 2010). See also Putnam (1970, 1973, 1975); Kripke (1980); Devitt (1981).
9. Lewis (1970, 1979); Jackson (1998); Segal (2000); Chalmers (2002a); Jackson (2004).
10. Schroeter (2008, 2012); Schroeter and Schroeter (2014b). On pain of vicious regress, the mechanisms 
underlying this organizational structure cannot be mediated by explicit identity judgments of the form 
⎡a = b⎤ or ⎡the referent of “a” = the referent of “b”⎤. The moral here is much the same as the one Lewis 
Carroll drew in the case of modus ponens: we must have some basic way of taking two thoughts to be 
co- referential that does not require an explicit identity judgment (Carroll 1895).
11. At the meta- level, in contrast, it’s possible to cite undermining or reinforcing evidence for the claim 
that certain attitudes within a conscious episode do in fact co- refer. Our point is that, in object- level 
thought, the immediate appearance of sameness does not seem to depend for its justification on such 
meta- level evidence. It might seem that thoughts like those expressed by “war is war” are counterex-
amples to this claim, since they can be justified by empirical evidence. However, it’s important to keep 
in mind that our claim is targeted at the level of thought rather than language, and the token elements of 
thought expressed by the two tokens of “war” in this sort of non- literal usage will not strike the subject 
as pertaining de jure to the same topic. (Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing us to clarify this 
point.) For further details about the appearance of de jure sameness and its role in a theory of concepts, 
see Schroeter (2012).
12. For a proposal in this spirit, see Chalmers (2011). Alternatively, a proponent of the matching model 
of concept identity can maintain that concepts are individuated in terms of reference- fixing criteria alone. 
In that case, a subject and her twin would share the same concept, but this fact wouldn’t guarantee same-
ness of reference. Concepts expressed by apparently context- neutral words like “water” or “arthritis” 
would thus be assimilated to the type of content expressed by indexicals like “here” and “now.”
13. For a discussion of this approach, see Schroeter (2007, 2008); Schroeter and Schroeter (2014b). 
For alternative ways of accommodating the mismatch between apparent and real de jure sameness, see, 
for example, Burge (1998); Fine (2007).
14. We address some of these questions elsewhere (Schroeter and Schroeter 2014b; 2015).
15. Obviously, if one defers to a group that in turn takes one’s own reference- fixer into account, this 
introduces circularity and no reference will be determined.
16. Of course, this is not to say that one can reject all substantive assumptions associated with a word 
at once while preserving the appearance of de jure sameness.
17. Even among co- conscious thoughts, direct binding relations seem explanatorily prior to a match in 
associated patterns of understanding. Any mechanism for keeping track of sameness must ultimately 
bottom out in some direct binding relations, on pain of a vicious explanatory regress. In particular, there 
must be some subpersonal mechanisms that directly bind together cognitive dispositions at a time as 
pertaining to a single topic, without relying on a match in the independent properties of those disposi-
tions. But if a cognitive mechanism needs to invoke binding at some point, it’s hard to see why this 
mechanism wouldn’t be recruited in directly binding together two token “Hesperus” thoughts: Why posit 
a subpersonal mechanism that binds each token separately to a set of reference- fixing dispositions and 
then looks for a precise match in those dispositions before treating them as obviously and incontrovert-
APQ 53_2 text.indd   207 2/9/16   10:20 AM
208  / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLy
ibly pertaining to the same topic? It’s more economical to suppose that two token “Hesperus” thoughts 
are directly bound together within the very same bundle of attitudes and dispositions (Schroeter 2012).
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